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Abstract
Quantum cryptography is the only approach to privacy ever proposed
that allows two parties (who do not share a long secret key ahead of time) to
communicate with provably perfect secrecy under the nose of an eavesdrop-
per endowed with unlimited computational power and whose technology is
limited by nothing but the fundamental laws of nature. This essay provides
a personal historical perspective on the field. For the sake of liveliness, the
style is purposely that of a spontaneous after-dinner speech.
∗Supported in parts by the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada,
the Canada Research Chair Programme and the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research.
1 Prehistory
The story begins in the early 1960’s, when Stephen Wiesner and Charles Bennett
were undergraduate students together at Brandeis University. Having many
common friends, they enjoyed talking with each other. Later, after Wiesner
had gone to graduate school at Columbia and Bennett at Harvard, they kept
in touch. In particular, the former payed frequent visits to the latter’s commu-
nal house in Boston. During one of those visits 1 in the late 60’s or early 70’s 2,
Wiesner told Bennett of his ideas for using quantum mechanics to make bank-
notes that would be impossible to counterfeit according to the laws of nature,
as well as of a “quantum multiplexing” channel, which would allow one party
to send two messages to another in a way that the receiving party could decide
which message to read but only at the cost of destroying the other message irre-
versibly.3
Wiesner submitted his paper “Conjugate Coding” to the IEEE Transactions
on Information Theory.4 Unfortunately, it was rejected, probably deemed incom-
prehensible by the editors and referees 5 because it was written in the technical
language of physicists (which must have seemed normal for a physicist!). It is
fortunate that Wiesner had expounded his ideas to Bennett, for they might other-
wise have been lost forever. Instead, Bennett mentioned them occasionally to
various people in the subsequent years, invariably meeting with very little sym-
pathy until. . .
1 Probably. . . Bennett’s memories of those long gone days have somewhat faded.
2 Ditto.
3 It can be argued that this marks the invention of Oblivious Transfer—or rather one-out-
of-two Oblivious Transfer [30]—ten years before Michael Rabin independently introduced his
original concept in the theoretical computer science community [40]. Of course, it took the
genius of Rabin to realize the central place that Oblivious Transfer was destined to occupy in
the sky of cryptography.
4 It is written “Submitted to IEEE, Information Theory” on top of Bennett’s surviving copy
of the original typewritten manuscript, but it is probably safe to guess that the Transactions
were meant.
5 This is an educated guess.
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2 History
One fine afternoon in late October 1979, I was swimming at the beach of a posh
hotel in San Juan, Puerto Rico. Imagine my surprise when this complete stranger
swims up to me and starts telling me, without apparent provocation on my part,
about Wiesner’s quantum banknotes! This was probably the most bizarre, and
certainly the most magical, moment in my professional life.6 Within hours, we had
found ways to mesh Wiesner’s coding scheme with some of the then-new concepts
of public-key cryptography [27]. Thus was born a wonderful collaboration that
was to spin out quantum teleportation [12], entanglement distillation [17], the first
lower bound 7 on the power of quantum computers [4], privacy amplification [18, 13]
and, of course, quantum cryptography [21].
The ideas that Bennett and I tossed around on the beach that day resulted
in the first paper ever published on quantum cryptography [11], indeed the paper
in which the term “Quantum Cryptography” was coined. It was presented at
Crypto ’82, an annual conference that had started one year earlier. By a strange
twist of history, our paper triggered the belated publication of Wiesner’s original
paper in a special issue of the ACM Newsletter Sigact News [44] that was other-
wise devoted to a selection of papers from the earlier Crypto ’81 conference.8
Thus, “Conjugate Coding” was finally disseminated in 1983, admittedly after
Rabin’s independent invention of his original version of Oblivious Transfer [40].
6 At the risk of taking some of the magic away, I must confess that it was not by accident that
Bennett and I were swimming at the same beach in Puerto Rico. We were both there for the
20th Annual IEEE Symposium on the Foundations of Computer Science. Bennett approached
me because I was scheduled to give a talk on relativized cryptography [20] on the last day of the
Symposium and he thought I might be interested in Wiesner’s ideas. By an amazing coincidence,
on my way to San Juan, I had read Martin Gardner’s account [31] of Bennett’s report [3] on
Chaitin’s Omega, which had just appeared in the November 1979 “Mathematical Games” column
of Scientific American—so, I knew the name but I could not recognize Bennett in that swimmer
because I did not know what he looked like.
7 We were trying to prove that unstructured search requires linear time even on quantum
computers but eventually had to settle on our best finding, which was an Ω(
√
n ) lower bound.
This result was rejected from all major theoretical computer science conferences until, giving up
on conferences, we published it in SIAM Journal on Computing [4]. Then, Lov Grover discovered
his celebrated algorithm [32] to solve the same unstructured search problem in a matching time
in O(
√
n ). At first blissfully unaware of our lower bound, he too was disappointed in not being
able to do better! This was a rare case in which an algorithm was proven optimal before its
discovery!
8 The proceedings of that very first Crypto had appeared solely as a Technical Report of the
University of California at Santa Barbara.
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Wiesner’s original banknotes, as well as our improvement, required quantum
information to be held captive in one place. This was a major practical drawback—
if any of this were ever to become practical, which certainly seemed unlikely at
the time—because, in those early days, we were using photon polarization as the
carrier of quantum information as if it were the only choice. Strangely, it took
us a few years after meeting on the beach before we realized, shortly after the
Crypto ’82 conference, that God had meant photons to travel rather than to
stay put! 9 This was the insight that made us think of using a quantum channel
to transmit confidential information. But, however obvious it may seem now, we
did not think of quantum key distribution right away.
At first, we wanted the quantum signal to encode the transmitter’s confidential
message in such a way that the receiver could decode it if no eavesdropper were
present, but any attempt by the eavesdropper to intercept the message would
spoil it without revealing any information. Any such futile attempt at eavesdrop-
ping would be detected by the legitimate receiver, alerting him to the presence
of the eavesdropper. Since this early scheme was unidirectional, it required the
legitimate parties to share a secret key, much as in a one-time pad encryption.
The originality of our scheme was that the same one-time pad could be reused
safely over and over again if no eavesdropping were detected. Thus, the title of
our paper was “Quantum Cryptography II : How to reuse a one-time pad safely
even if P=NP ” [10]. We submitted this paper to major theoretical computer
science conferences, such as STOC (The ACM Annual Symposium on Theoreti-
cal Computer Science), but we failed to have it accepted. Contrary to Wiesner’s
“Conjugate Coding”, however, our “Quantum Cryptography II ” paper has forever
remained unpublished (copies are available from the authors).10
We all but forgot about this early idea in 1983, when we realized how much
easier it would be to use the quantum channel to transmit an arbitrarily long
random secret key. If eavesdropping were detected on the quantum channel, due
to unavoidable disturbance, the key would be thrown away; otherwise it could be
used safely to transmit a sensitive message by use of the classical one-time pad
scheme. In essence, this detour via the one-time pad allowed us to turn nature’s
9 This is really a shame because Wiesner’s original multiplexing channel already used polarized
photons to transmit information!
10 The idea of safely reusing a one-time pad was resurrected two decades later by Ivan Damg˚ard,
Thomas Pedersen and Louis Salvail [24, 25], who were totally unaware of our earlier work [10].
It must be said, however, that the scheme put forward by Bennett and me was an unproven hack
at best, whereas the new work is beautifully set on firm foundations.
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given eavesdropping-detection channel into an eavesdropping-prevention channel.
Moreover, the new scheme was much more robust against lost photons since a
random subsequence of a random bit string is still a random bit string, albeit
shorter. We wrote up a proposal for the 1983 IEEE Symposium on Information
Theory (ISIT), which was held in St-Jovite (near my hometown of Montre´al) that
year. Not only was it accepted (yeah!), but it was granted a long presentation.
The corresponding one-page abstract [6]—such is the rule at ISIT—provides the
official birth certificate for Quantum Key Distribution, which remains to this date
the most feasible of all proposed applications for the burgeoning field of quantum
information science. So feasible indeed that all you need to implement quantum
key distribution is a few chocolate balls [42]! :-)
Shortly thereafter, my good friend Vijay Bhargava was in charge of a special
session on coding and information theory for yet another IEEE conference, which
took place in Bangalore, India 11, in December 1984. He invited me to give a talk on
any subject of my choice, and naturally I chose Quantum Cryptography considering
how difficult it was to get these ideas published at the time. The resulting paper [7]
gave its name to the “BB84 protocol” even though it had been described in detail
as early as 1983 at the IEEE ISIT talk but not in the paper (how much can you
say in a one-page abstract?). Retrospectively, it is amusing to note that the only
reason the BB84 protocol was finally published is that it had not been submitted
to the conference that printed it in its proceedings! Thanks Vijay!
A curious episode took place when Doug Wiedemann, having read Wiesner’s
“Conjugate Coding” in Sigact News, reinvented the exact BB84 protocol in 1997,
even called it “quantum cryptography”, and published it in Sigact News [43] as
well; see also [8].
Throughout the 1980’s, very few people took quantum cryptography seriously
and most people simply ignored it. Eventually, Bennett and I decided we had to
show them by building a working prototype! Bennett asked John Smolin to help
with the hardware and I asked Franc¸ois Bessette and Louis Salvail to help with the
software. Essentially without any special budget allocated to the project, we were
able, in late October 1989, to establish history’s first secret quantum transmission,
over a staggering distance of 32.5 centimetres, precisely on the tenth anniversary
of our meeting at the San Juan beach [9, 5] !
11 This conference was organized in parts to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the Indian
Institute of Technology.
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It remains a mystery to me that this successful prototype made a world of
difference to physicists, who suddenly paid attention. In particular, it gave us
the opportunity to publish in Scientific American [15]. The funny thing is that,
while our theory had been serious, our prototype was mostly a joke. Indeed, the
largest piece in the prototype was the power supply needed to feed in the order of
one thousand volts to Pockels cells, used to turn photon polarization. But power
supplies make noise, and not the same noise for the different voltages needed for
different polarizations. So, we could literally hear the photons as they flew, and
zeroes and ones made different noises. Thus, our prototype was unconditionally
secure against any eavesdropper who happened to be deaf ! :-)
Perhaps inspired by our “success”, gifted experimentalists 12 began building
ever more sophisticated prototypes capable of realizing quantum key distribution
over tens of kilometres of optical fibre, some of which are even commercially avail-
able. Line of sight experiments have also been carried out over similar distances.
Serious plans already exist to link earth-based users by a quantum cryptographic
process mediated by satellite.13 The possibilities are endless now that a worldwide
quantum cryptographic network is within reach of current technology. Several
decades ago, transatlantic telephone communications were carried out by sub-
marine cables. The idea that ordinary people would soon communicate through
satellites was as far fetched back then as an array of quantum communication
satellites would appear today. As Theodore Roosevelt once said, “The only limit
to our realization of tomorrow will be our doubts of today. Let us move forward
with strong and active faith.” 14
Far more important than the “success” of our prototype, another factor played
a crucial role in the newly-found interest of physicists for quantum cryptography
in the early 1990’s. This was the re-reinvention of quantum key distribution by
Artur Ekert, and the fact that he published his ideas in Physical Review Letters [29]
rather than computer science journals and conferences. Contrary to Wiedemann,
however, Ekert did not reinvent the BB84 protocol. Instead, he involved quantum
entanglement [28] and the violation of Bell’s theorem [2]. Even though Ekert’s
12 The list of experimentalists involved goes beyond the scope of this historical essay and we
prefer to mention no one rather than to omit many.
13 In the “simple” version, the satellite would be privy of the secret key it helped establish.
More sophisticated proposals would use quantum entanglement to prevent this weakness. In that
case, a dishonest satellite can prevent the legitimate parties from establishing a key at all, but
it cannot fool them into believing their key is shared and secret when it is not.
14 As beautifully engraved in his Memorial in Washington, D.C.
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proposal was equivalent to BB84 in a sense [16], the idea proved to be very fertile,
particularly after the invention of entanglement distillation [17] and quantum pri-
vacy amplification [26]. Thinking about entanglement-based cryptography has
made it possible to give much simpler proofs of unconditional security for the orig-
inal un-entangled BB84 scheme [41]. Moreover, as mentioned already, the use of
entanglement could be instrumental in a truly secure satellite-based implementa-
tion of quantum cryptography. Finally, whenever the long-term storage of quantum
information will become feasible, entanglement-based cryptography will provide a
form of key distribution that would remain secure not only against eavesdropping,
but also against burglary.
3 Beyond Key Distribution
Many people think that quantum cryptography and quantum key distribution
are one and the same. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Let us first
recall the two results presented in Wiesner’s original “Conjugate Coding”, which
started the entire field. Whether or not his quantum banknotes can be considered
“cryptography” is a matter of taste, but there can be no doubt that his quantum
multiplexing channel was mainstream cryptography ahead of its time.
One of my most vivid memories took place when our ideas for sending confiden-
tial messages by way of quantum signals were being rejected. I had been visiting
Bennett at his house in Croton-on-Hudson.15 As my stay was coming to an end,
he drove me back to the train station. I boarded the train; he was facing me on the
platform, waving goodbye. And suddenly, we realized that Wiesner’s multiplex-
ing channel could be used to implement Rabin’s oblivious transfer! Bennett was
so excited that he started jumping up and down as the doors closed between us.
As the train picked up speed, I saw his spectacles flying off into the air. In retro-
spect, I have seen him more excited only once in the quarter-of-century I have
known him: when we invented quantum teleportation one decade later.
You may wonder what the fuss was about. Didn’t I write in the first paragraph
of this essay (footnote 3) that Wiesner deserved credit for inventing oblivious
transfer? Well, at the time, only Rabin’s original version of oblivious transfer
had appeared in the theoretical computer science community [40]. It was already
15 I cannot remember if this episode took place before or after the invention of the BB84
protocol, but I think it was before.
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regarded as a powerful primitive, although its universality for secure two-party
computation was yet to be established [34]. With hindsight, it is obvious that
Rabin’s oblivious transfer and Wiesner’s multiplexing channels are similar, and
that the latter can serve to implement the former.16 Yet, the connection had
not occurred to us until that precise instant. Out of the blue, we realized for
the first time that quantum mechanics could help solve mainstream (classical)
cryptographic problems beyond the mere transmission of confidential information.
The sky was the limit 17, which did not prevent Bennett’s eyeglasses from shattering
on the train platform.
The other cryptographic task that we studied in the early days was coin-tossing.
The classical concept had been pioneered by Manuel Blum at Crypto ’81 [19].
It is a little-known fact that the 1983 ISIT abstract that introduced quantum key
distribution [6], as well as its better known 1984 big brother [7] that gave its name
to the BB84 protocol, were just as much about quantum coin-tossing as they were
about quantum key distribution. Consider for instance the following excerpt from
the original 1983 version:
We also present a protocol for coin-tossing by exchanges of quantum
messages. [. . . ] our protocol is secure against traditional kinds of
cheating, even by an opponent with unlimited computational power.
Ironically, however, it can be subverted by use of a still subtler quantum
phenomenon, the so-called Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen [EPR] paradox,
which in effect allows the initiating party to toss the coin after the
responding party has announced his guess of the outcome.
This was a rare instance of a paper that introduces a new protocol and breaks
it in the same paper 18, but I guess everything is allowed in an invited paper.
Thanks again Vijay! I remember when I was giving talks in the mid 1980’s. I used
to spend most of my time on quantum key distribution, because that was the
“serious” part, but I had much more fun with coin-tossing. This pleasure came
in particular from the need to explain the EPR “paradox” [28] to audiences of
computer scientists who had never heard about such a bizarre thing in those days.
Also, we were particularly proud of having discovered a way to make “practical”
16 In fact, they are equivalent [23].
17 Well, not exactly because Wiesner had explained in “Conjugate Coding” how to defeat his
own quantum multiplexing channel! But the attack was very complicated and we were hoping
at the time that it would be unfeasible to mount or possible to circumvent.
18 Wiesner’s multiplexing channel provides another such example.
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use of entanglement, albeit for an evil purpose. To this day, I still think our
1983 ISIT paper marks the first explicit use of EPR long-distance correlations for
information processing purposes.
Nearly every time I gave this talk, someone would suggest a way to fix the
coin-tossing protocol, so as to get around the EPR attack. Invariably, I could find
within seconds a way to adapt the attack to the modified protocol. . . until Claude
Cre´peau came along. Soon, Cre´peau joined the select group of believers, at a time
when Bennett and I were possibly the only two active researchers in quantum
cryptography. We quickly realized that the quantum coin-tossing protocol could
easily be turned into a quantum bit commitment protocol, which is possibly a
stronger primitive. But of course, the quantum bit commitment protocol derived
from the ISIT83 and BB84 papers were just as vulnerable to an EPR attack as
the corresponding coin-tossing protocol.
Helped by Richard Jozsa and Denis Langlois, we thought at some point that
we had designed an unbreakable quantum bit commitment scheme [22]. This was
a time of high hopes because we had already developed a quantum protocol to
achieve oblivious transfer provided bit commitment were available [14].19 Alas,
we had fallen into the same trap that had doomed the earlier ISIT83/BB84 coin-
tossing/bit-commitment protocol [37, 35] ! After many failed attempts at fixing the
problem, it was discovered that unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment
is in fact impossible [38, 36].
Does it mean that the benefits of quantum information for cryptography cannot
go further than allowing two people to exchange messages with absolute confiden-
tiality? Certainly not! Consider coin-tossing again. Perfect coin-tossing is possible
even classically if relativity is invoked [39]. At a very precise moment in time 20,
each party sends a random bit to the other. The parties have agreed that the
coin-toss is heads if the bits are the same and tails otherwise. Cheating is not
possible since relativity forbids either party to know what the other party has sent
at the time transmission is required.
The situation changes drastically if we restrict our attention to (more usual)
protocols in which parties take turn in sending messages to each other. In the
19 There are strong theoretical reasons to believe that secure oblivious transfer cannot be built
out of bit commitment in the classical world [33]. This provides a definite advantage to the
quantum setting. In particular, it makes it possible to derive computationally secure quantum
oblivious transfer from one-way functions, a feat thought to be classically impossible.
20 We assume that the two parties are in the same inertial reference frame.
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case of classical messages, no matter the protocol, it is always possible for one
of the two parties to decide the outcome of the coin-toss given enough computa-
tional power! Moreover, the availability of quantum computers would make such
cheating possible even in practice for most proposed implementations. In the spirit
of quantum key distribution, can quantum mechanics help in designing protocols
that remain secure against cheaters endowed with unlimited computational power
and whose technology is limited by nothing but quantum mechanics? The bad
news is that perfect coin-tossing protocols—in which neither party could influ-
ence the coin-toss at all—cannot exist even if the players are allowed to trans-
mit quantum messages. However, Andris Ambainis has discovered a wonderful
quantum protocol [1] in which neither party can select a desired outcome and
influence the process in a way that this wish will come true with a probability
better than 75%. This is not perfect, but it is certainly better than anything
classically achievable.
And what about quantum bit commitment, oblivious transfer and other post-
key-distribution cryptographic tasks? As I write these lines, Cre´peau are others
are hard at work, finding ever more imaginative ways to resurrect them in our
quantum world.
But this is where I put down my pen for tonight.
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